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By Harold R. Isaacs
These notes have to do with the climates In which
various American images of the Chinese have grown. They
are in part a response to stimuli in the 60-odd inter-
views I have so far conducted in the course of my present
inquiry into American images of China and India. They
are also, to a substantial degree, a re-examination and
a ref ocusing of many things long familiarly known but
never brought together in this particular framework.
This is a draft of notes intended to be absorbed
later in analysis of the completed interview material.
In the writing, however, it acquired a form and content
which seemed to suggest the value of a limited distribu-
tion and a request for comments. One additional section,
on the images connected with the. Chinese population in
the U.S., and a separate but corollary paper analyzing
the body of U.S. opinion poll data on relevant matters
are still in preparation.
A study, in similar terms, of the development of
American images relating to India lies on the further
work agenda. I would be especially grateful for any
suggestions any reader of this paper might have also to
offer in this connection.
H. R. I.
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I. Scratches on Our Kinds
In 1940 an opinion poll found that about half the
people interviewed could not locate Singapore or the
then Dutch East Indies except to agree that they were "in
the same part of the world as China and India." In 1942,
four months after Pearl Harbor, another poll found that
60% of a national sample could not locate either China
or India on an outline map of the world. By the war's
end, more Americans had discovered the approximate where-
abouts of such places as Chungking, Manila, and Vladivostok,
at least to the extent of being able to name the countries
in which they were situated. A smaller number could
identify Okinawa, Osaka, Kyushu, and Java, although not
even a majority of college-educated people could still
put their finger on Singapore and it had not as yet occurred
to the pollsters, in 1945, even to ask people about place
names in India.
There is of course a generalized American vagueness
about geography of which these findings are a part, but
the vagueness about Asian geography is certainly greater
than it is about European. This would reflect a central
fact about the emergent American in world affairs in our
time: there has been little in his total cultural setting
3to give him any serious body of knowledge or information-.
much less affinities--relating to Asia or things Asian.
There is surely nothing to compare with the intricate web
of bonds that tie him in so many different ways to Europe
and things European, his origins near or remote, his
cultural roots, his language, his religion, his history,
his picture of the world. Indeed, America was born and
grew up in the generations of Europe's world paramountcy
and relatively few have seemed to realize even now that
this age has ended, that the center of gravity in world
affairs has shifted eastward, that Western Europe--for
all its continuing great weight and importance--has
reverted to being but a smallish peninsula dangling from
one end of the great Eurasian continent.
On the other hand, consider a paradox: the history
of America's emergence as a major world power is really
also the history of the decline of Europe and the rise of
Asia as the principal setting for decisive world events.
The first foreign war fought by this country in its
maturing period made it a Pacific power. The first really
major stroke of American diplomacy with a prime impact on
world affairs was the Open Door initiative of 1900 relating
to China. America's primary contest for world power in
the first half of this century was at the core a contest
with Japan for supremacy in the Pacific. It was an American
4initiative that "opened" Japan to the world a hundred
years ago, initiating the history that moved from
Portsmouth in 1905 to Washington in 1921-22 to Pearl
Harbor in 1941. It was the explosion of the struggle
for Pacific mastery, rather than any culminating event in
Europe wh ich finally pushed this country into the Second
World War. In the new and greater power conflict ushered
In by the end of the Second World War, Asia quickly became
the primary theater, the scene of some of the most fate-s
ful decisions and fateful defeats of our current history.
Now, in a manner unthinkable even to most thoughtful
Americans a bare dozen years ago, China has become a major
factor in domestic American politics, seating and unseating
men in high office, building or wrecking public reputatimns,
filling our public prints for months and years on end with
concern, alarms, controversy, hand-wringing, recrimination
and contumely. More, China--and by definition the rest
of Asia--has become a central and even a dominating factor
in- the host of decisions forced on the United States by
its new place in world affairs, affecting in one degree
or another our relations with every other nation, friend
or foe, on the globe.
Despite this, through almost all of this time,
Americans, even t houghtful Americans in high places, have
continued to view the world across the Atlantic, keeping
5their eyes focused on the closer, more recognizable land-
scapes of Europe and seeing the East as "Far" when, just
behind them, much nearer than they realized, the countries
and peoples of whom Americans knew so little were shaping
so much of the American destiny.
Yet this lack of knowledge by no means infers a
lack of awareness. There are all sorts of scratches on
American minds about Asia, associations, images, notions,
ideas, information, attitudes, gleaned in fragments over
time from childhood or under the more recent pressures of
contemporary events. These are still the principal in-
gredient in American thinking about Asia, even in the
thinking of that very smiall group of Americans who out of
need, desire, or duty, have had considerably more contact
and experience and knowledge relating to Asia than most of
their countrymen. Almost all these deposits left in
AmerIcan minds have in common a quality of remoteness, of
the exotic, the bizarre, the unfamiliar, and--before 1941--
a lack of connection with the more visible important
affairs of life. Hence in differing circumstances to
different people, they have seemed vaguely exciting or
beautiful or attractive, or vaguely dangerous, ugly, and
repellent, and sometimes all these things jumbled together.
The whole is dominated not merely by a sense of in-
comprehension but of incomprehensibility. Indeed, the
6first figure to appear in an Asian setting in many
American minds is still very likely to be that well-
established creature of the Western imagination, the
"inscrutable Oriental," a character who remains very in-
scrutable indeed so long as he remains unscrutinized.*
With the aid of free association, however, he is quickly
joined in many American minds by a host of other figures
who come to people the scene, figures, images, and ideas,
the wispy products of the classroom, Sunday school and
church, of dimly-recalled storybooks and magazines, car-
toons and photographs, motion pictures, and newspaper
columns, semi-ectoplasmic notions so sparse in substance
yet so capable of long life and prodigious multiplication.
These, like a set of hieroglyphics or cave drawings, are
the starting points of our inquiry. There is, of course,
no logic or consistency or order in the way these images
inhabit corners of our thinking. They recur in different
individuals spasmodically and in dismembered pieces. It
is only in this form that they have emerged in a lifetime
of encounters, in many of these interviews or appeared in
* The formula of inscrutability as a special' Eastern"
characteristic remains firmly imbedded. Thus a book
advertisement opens: "The Orient has always fascinated
us. Wisdom and mystery and subtlety dwell in the East and
in its books..." In the same issue of the New York Ines
Book Review (October 24, 1954), Robert Payne, a prolific
writer on Asian themes, starts a book review with this
inscrutable sentence: 'There are mysteries in the Indian
mind which we shall never be able to solve, but there are
also implications."
7scattered bits in the literature and the public prints
over time. The attempt to arrange them in some signi-
ficant pattern can be made only through gpeculative and
largely intuitive analysis.
11. The Chinese Motifs
Two contrasting associations with Asia are planted
early in the mind of almost every American school child:
the Mongol hordes and Marco Polo. The first is the an-
cestor of the threatening image of the "Yellow Peril"
and its present-day counterpart. The second is a main
source of the sense of glamor, wisdom, and superiority
attached to our picture of ancient China. If only from
his study of the explorations that led to the discovery of
America, the school child has also heard and remembered
something about the silk, tea, spices, and riches of Asia
for which men ventured so boldly and so far. The sheen
and touch and aroma of Cathay or the vaguer 'Indies"
for which Columbus set sail are mingled in this history
with the clank and bravura of the adventurers, the first
sallying forth of the churchmen and the great navigators,
and the Asian glitter they and their successors brought
back to the courts and palaces of Europe.
Here it seems possible to discern a beginning of an
important distinction in the sorting of American Asian
'I
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associations. The images of splendor and wealth and
fabulousness connected with the vague and unsituated
"Indies" would seem to have become attached subsequently
to India, whose jewel-laden potentates became and have
long remained a dominant feature of American thought-
patterns about that country. To this later was added
the concept-of India as a land of religion, of many gods,
holy men, and obscure philosophies. In fact, the whole
notion of the "mysticism of the Sastw which remains so
firmly imbedded to this day is much more associated in
American minds with India than with China or any of the
Moslem parts of Asia. The ideas accumulated about China
are from the beginning of a quite different order: in
some degree we learn early that the Chinese originated
gunpowder, made paper and devised printing methods, knew
astronomy and mathematics while the Western world still
lay largely in savagery, that they had sages, one of whom
was named Confucius, built the Great Wall which was one
of the wonders of the world, and possessed an ancient
wisdom that had to be regarded respectfully. This is the
beginning of the critically important fact that of all
the countries and peoples of Asia, China and the Chinese
have made by far the deepest impression on the American
consciousneus, that American contacts with China have been
more substantial, more particularized, and have created a
9far more complex pattern of ideas and images and varieties
of actual experience.
Chinese motifs have long been woven into parts of
the American fabric. The tea that was dumped into Boston
harbor came off a British ship that had just arrived from
Amoy, China. The first American clipper ship sailed from
New England to the China coast in 1784--bearing the name
Empress of China and opening one of the most romantic and
glamorized chapters in American maritime history. New
England merchant-mariners brought back tea and teak and
silk and ideas about China and the Chinese. They gave a
Chinese touch to the interior of Now Hagland homes and
contributed a thin layer of awareness of the Chinese to
American minds, a blend of romance, excitement, obscurity,
beauty, distance, strangeness, and danger which has con-
tinued to exert its influence on American ideas- about
China down to our own time.
These first contacts are certainly not unrelated to
the fact that beginning between 1880 and 1840 first tens
then hundreds and eventually thousands of American
missionaries went to China to save souls, heal bodies,
educate minds. The social and individual roots of this
evangelical-benevolent enterprise do not form part of
this inquiry. The important fact here is that it did
come into being and that it was directed from the beginning
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toward the Chinese, spreading to other quarters much
later and never on quite the same scale. This enterprise
has placed a permanent and even decisive impress on the
emotional underpinning of American thinking about China.
While these Americans were beginning to go to China
to carry forward there what they regarded as the Lord's
work, Chinese emigrants were beginning to come, for
quite different reasons, to the United States. Between
1854 and 1882 some 300,000 Chinese laborers entered this
country, creating the beginnings of a Chinese segment of
American life itself. They became part of the American
prejudice pattern, the objects of popular and legal
discrimination, and finally of rigid exclusion which
lasted until only a few years ago. From among these
immigrants and their descendants came figures which are
firmly established in American life, literature, and
folklore, the pidgin-speaking Chinese cook and laundryman,
the alum Chinatowns in the big cities, and the present
Chinese population of about 120,000, small but highly visible.
Between 1854 and 1949, about 22,000 young Chinese came to
this country from China to study at our colleges and
universities, establishing still another major current of
cultural contact with effects both in the United States
and in China over the generations. American trading with
China has been more or less continuous since before 1800
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and American political relations with China go back, in
a f ormal treaty-making sense, to 1844. American soldiers
have fought in big and small wars in China from the time
an American adventurer led Manchu forces against the
Taiping rebels in the 1880s to the quelling of the Boxer
Rebellion in 1900, the intervening years of treaty port
upheavals and river skirmishes to the great flow of nearly
a quarter of a million Americans to China during the Second
World War.
Out of all these contacts we have acquired a litera-
ture and a certain set of traditions. American scholars,
soldiers, journalists, novelists, and artists have pro-
duced a great library of works, American books about China,
its history, its pilitics, its society, its art, its
poetry, its gardens, and even its cooking. These writers,
from S. Wells Williams and H. B. Morse to Pearl Buck,
have on the whole created a highly respectful, warmly
admiring, and sometimes strongly sentimentalized picture
of Chinese life and culture and, despite all its vicissi-
tudes, a very positive picture of the life of the foreigner
in China in decades past. From among these writers and
students and artists, including many children of missionaries
born in China who went into various fields of work in China,
including American government service, came a group that
was committed in a peculiarly intense way to a special
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love for China and almost all its worts. Alongside the
body of literature produced so largely by this group,
another, quite different one came into being, based
usually on the Chinese in a foreign setting rather than
in China, This was mainly a literature of the bizarre,
of crime and adventure: the school of Fu Nanchu which
for so many Americans is the only school in which they
have ever heard anything at all about the Chinese, or,
on the side of virtue, the school of Charlie Chan, whose
Chinese wiliness was put at the disposal of law and order
and whose pseudo-Confucian maxims became for some years
part of the currency of the American language.
These Chinese pieces in the American mosaic are not
large when viewed against our culture as a whole; but
neither are they small. They are certainly visible to
the naked eye. They have established a set of ideas,
images, notions, attitudes, and real or vicarious experi-
ences shared in some degree and to some extent by millions
of Americans for many generations. As might be expected
of a people who have made so much of the duality of the
hu man spirit and experience, these images tend often to
come in Jostling pairs: the good heathen and the ungrate-
ful wretch, the wise sage and the sadistic executioner,
the famine victim and the eater of wondrously good food,
the opera bouffe warrior and the heroic or dangerous
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fighter, the traditional friend and the contemporary foe,
the thrifty and honorable man and the sly and treacherous
criminal. These, and many others, occur in American minds
with stresses varying widely in time and place. As many
of our interviews have shown, they are also of ten jumbled
all together, with particular facets coming more clearly
into view when struck by the moving lights of changing
circumstances. In recent years these lights have moved
with a brightness and a rapidity which, indeed, has often
seemed to bewilder and even to blind us all.
III. The Ungrateful Wretches
For more than a hundred years a great many Americans
saw the Chinese as good heathen whom they were called
upon to help save from damnation. The mission enterprise
came out of one of the major growths in American life,
evangelical Christianity, with its deepest roots in rural
America. Since by far the greater part of this missionary
effort was concentrated in China, it created a special
and even unique place for that country in the minds of
millions of Americans for whom, classically and tradition-
ally, the rest of the world was something to be ignored
at almost all cost. This is at least part of the explana-
tion for the remarkable phenomenon in recent American
politics in which a great many super-isolationists in
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relation to Europe have become super-interventionists
where China was concerned. Less spectacularly, but no
less significantly, this sense of a special obligation
and a special compulsion in relation to China is felt in
wide sections of the Aerican population. For this odd
fact, the influence and impact of the American missionary
experience provides at least one key.
There must be relatively few people of mature age in
this country who, if they belonged to one of the great
Protestant denominations and went to church at all, have
not in some way been touched by this experience. Family
connections, friends, or fellow-townsfolk went to China
as missionaries. Visiting missionaries who had been to
China came to the churches of America Sunday after Sunday
to tell about their work and to spur their flocks to help.
Pennies, nickels, dimes and quarters, great heaps of
cherished coins were dropped in the collection plates by
children and adults alike for this cause week in and week
out, year after year. This' procedure and the feelings
associated with it have been spontaneously remembered, I
might add, by a substantial number of those interviwed
so far for the purposes of this study.
This pattern of charity and benevolence, with its
accompanying sense of mentorship or even guardianship over
the heathen Chinese, became a major theme in American
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feeling and behavior toward China over the years. It was
coupled--as befitted a conscientious parent of the time--
with the judicious display or exercise of force whenever
occasion demanded. The clearest early example of this com-
bination of emotions and motivations occurred in 1900
when American troops participated in putting down the
Boxer Rebellion; the United States joined with other
nations in exacting a heavy indemnity from the feeble
Chinese government in Peking, and then used its share of
the money as a fund to finance the education of Chinese,
mostly in this country. At the same time the United
States proclaimed its famous "Open Door Policy -- designed
to checkmate the free-for-all encroachments on China that
followed the Boxer episode. This policy was a product of
many factors and circumstances having almost nothing to
do with benevolence. It has nevertheless become the
symbolic example at the highest possible level of America's
disinterested guardianship over China's best interests.
The missionary movement never succeeded in Christian-
izing China. The Catholic Church, whose mission enter-
prise in China was much more European in origin and per-
sonnel than American, and which started at least two
centuries before the first American Protestant missionaries
arrived, eventually claimed about 8,000,000 Chinese Catholics.
The total number of Chinese Protestants is put at between
16
one and two million, a grand total of los than on per
cent of the Chinese population. A considerable thotgh
indeterminable number of these would often be called
"rice-bowl Christians," i.e., Chinese who characteristic-
ally accepted church membership for some af its practical
advantages. The Chinese acceptance of Western superiority
in certain spheres never to any important degree included
acceptance of the Western claim of svperiority in the
sphere of religion. China's own systems were too deeply
imbedded and these implied an acceptance of an accumula-
tion of truths rather than the acceptance of a single
truth about man's place in the universe.
In any case, the conduct af most Western men and the
Western nations in China in this period did not suggest
to the Chinese that the particular truth claimed by these
foreigners was potent enough to control their actual
behavior. Eren among missionaries, Christians who acted
like Christians were not remarkably common. The Lord's
work was unfortunately mixed up too visibly with political
and economic pressure, invading warships and armies, and
the regime of special privileges established for foreigners
symbolized by the foreign gunboats that patrolled China's
rivers and foreign forces that occupied strategic treaty
ports. The fact that in the first af the West's wars against
China (in 1842, 1858, and 1860), the rights of missionaries,
I
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the rights of the opium trade, the forced opening of the
treaty ports and the system of special privilege known
as extraterritoriality were all negotiated together was
not calculated to win a sympathetic Chinese bearing for
Christian doctrines of peace, humility, or salvation.
Through the decades right up until the 1980s, Chinese
resistance to Western encroachment often centered on the
missionary as the nearest and prime symbol of the rule
of the "foreign devils" and when missionaries were
attacked, as they often were, nobody turned the other
cheek. More often a gunboat turned up to retaliate.
There is really no mystery at all about the Christian
failure in China.
Nevertheless, the Christian impact in Chinese affairs
has been considerable, if only through the schools in
which so many Chinese received their first exposure to
Western influences, and from which me so many of the
leaders on all sides of China's turbulent politics in the
last fifty years. Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Chinese
Republic, was a Christian, although in his later years
he lost faith in the mentors who failed him. His sister-w
in-law, Mei-ling Soong, married Chiang Kai-shek, whose
rise to power, in 1928, was signalized by his very formal
and very public conversion to Christianity. Many mission-
aries came to invest much of their hope and their commit-
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ment in the Chiangs and the regime they symbolized for
twenty-one years. Missionaries were prominent among
those who first urged the United States to stpport Chiang
in the days when he had barely shed the allianc, with
Russia and the Communists through which he came to power.
In the heavily-charged controversies over China in more
recent years, a prominent role has been played by Americans
with roots in the mission movement: Congressman Walter
Judd, a former China missionary himself, Henry Luce, the
son of China missionary parents, John Leighton Stuart,
our last ambassador to Nanking, John P. Davies, until
recently of the State Department, and others. For these
individuals, this involvement with China was never casual
or incidental. It was profoundly emotional, even
messianic, touching some of the deepest springs of their
lives and, often, their own and their parents' lifetimes
of work and commitment. In much lesser degree yet still
with peculiar force, greater masses of Americans touched
by the mission effort identify themselves in a special
way with affairs that affect China.
From the pennies in the collection plates through the
Boxer Indemnity Fund, the millions of dollars given for
churches, schools, hospitals, and for tie people to man
them, to the hundreds of millions and billions poured out
in more direct aid in more recent years, these threads
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lead us straight to the fact that Americans had cown to
expect the emotion of gratitude, not to say affection,
from China and the Chinese In a way unique in all American
relations with other countries and peoples up to the most
recent times. All the difficult and ambivalent psycho-
logical pressures attached to the role of benefactor have
become part of the American state of mind relating to
China. This expresses itself in many ways, but the most
important one is that when the Chinese began to "fail*
us and, more, came to assume a pe ture of hostility
toward us, they were not merely wretches; they were un-
grateful wretches. They were biting the hand that has
fed and nourished them these many years; they were repay-
ing good with evil.
This feeling has been more obvious since the Commu-
nists won power in China in 1949. But it was an emotion
aroused quite clearly before then by the unfortunate fail-
ures of the Nationalist regime in which such great hopes
had been placed and about which such powerful myths had
been propagated. It is not often realized that Chiang
Kai-shek and the group around him were, in their own wayg,
also "anti-Western* on historical, political, and cultural
grounds, as a reading of Chiang Kai-shek's book, China's
Destiny, will readily show. The Kuomintang Nationalists,
as well as the Communists, were the products of a nationalist
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moViement directed against Western poer and influence.
Both were formed in the same political currents that
began to sweep China some 80 years ago. Both share a con-
siderable number -of basic notions as well as a great many
political-organizational forms and methods.
The American sense that the Chinese have somehow
failed us was one of the dominant emotions with which
many Americans reacted to the revelations--which began to
gain wide currency in 1944 and continued until the Commu-
nist takeover in 1949o-of the depths of the Kuomintang
failure in China: the numerous accounts of corruption,
lack of effective leadership, the seeming total incapacity
to use American help effectively to meet either the demands
of the war against Japan, the needs of the nation and its
people after that war was over, or the threat of the
Communist onset. It was through this period that many
Americans tried in various ways to see the Communists as
a hopeful or more tolerable alternative. Many American
liberals accepted and clung doggedly to the not ion that
the Communists were merely '"agrarian reformers* and more
truly democratic than their Kuomintaqg opponents. Not a
few American military men, often af the most conservative
cast of mind both politically and socially, speculatively
viewed the Communists in the war years as a more effective
military instrument against the Japanese. Later, in 1948
and 1949, the evidence is that American businessmen in
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Shanghai -- traditionally neither liberal nor wide-eyed--"
felt the Communist advent might end the chaos in which it
was impossible to do any business and redound to their
advantage. In the event, of course, all these expectations
were somewhat severely disappointed.
Thus whether by Kuomintmg Nationalists or by Commu-
nists, Americans have felt betrayed by the Chinese. In
the end it turned out that the proffered salvation had
been scorned, generations of devoted he2p nullified, all
the schooling and healing and ministering brought to
nought, all the advice ignored, all the hundreds of
millions of dollars frittered uselessly away. It was
possible sometimes to find solace in the belief that the
Chinese people as a whole too have been betrayed by
successive leaderships. In this continued emotional
identification with the Chinese "people" the faith can
persist that all was not really in vain, all hope not
really gae. But this is an abstraction that is never
easy to sustain. The "people" in the mass were little
reached by our benefactions. It was the leadership that
came within our purview, that we touched with our schools,
our gifts, our loans, our ideas. These were the most
hopeful of yesterday's heathen, these are the ungrateful
wretches of today.
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Worst and perhaps most unseating of all, the sense
of Chinese betrayal is edged by the accompanying sense
of our guilt. Guardianship implies a responsibility:
the ward's failure can never be his alone. There was
the failure to reach more of the people more adequately;
there was the failure to produce effective identification
among those we did reach. The mad scramble to pin this
guilt on some particular individuals who treasonably or
otherwise "lost" China has been more than unscrupulous
politics. It has been the desperate search for scapegoats
by people who profoundly believed that they "had" China
to "lose" and could not or would not accept any share of
the blame for failing to hold on to it. From this flows
much of the unique intensity and unreasoning quality of
American feeling about China and the conflicts over China
policy which have dominated American political life
for the last five years.
IV. The Subhumans
The picture Americans have had of the Chinese as
spiritual and political wards of the American nation casts
the Chinese in an essentially inferior role. There is
another whole range of images in which the Chinese are
seen as something much less than inferior, in which they
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are seen in fact as something less than human. These are
made up of many ingredients, partly rooted in certain real
aspects of Chinese life as viewed or known by Americans,
partly in psychological ad justments in American -minds to
facts which are incomprehensible or intolerable or both.
To begin with, there is the conception of the faceless
mass. The one thing that almost all Americans know about
the Chinese is that there is a fantastically large number
of them. The recurring phrases are "teeming masses" and
"swarms" and--wespecially in military situations--whordes."
In these masses, the individual is indistinguishable.
Almost everyone will recognize this in the nearly-universal
cliche: "you .can't tell one Chinese (or one "Oriental')
from another." This faceless mass has produced many
different reactions at different times in different
Americans. But I am interested here in two attributes
that stand out in the cluster attached to it: inhuman
cruelty and inhuman powers of endurance.
The association of cruelty with the Chinese is very
literal and specific and not at all imaginary in origin.
The term "Chinese torture" has a place in our language,
signifying devilishly ingenious methods of inflicting pain
and death. While the tortures associated with China
probably do not exceed in devilishness those even more
familiarly associated with medieval Europe, they have had
attached to them a quality of terrifying exquisiteness
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never quite achieved by the racks of the Inquisition.
The survival of these practices into modern times has no
doubt had much to do with sharpening and specializing this
image. At least until the more recent advent of the
totalitarians in Russia and Germany, Buropean or Western
peoples liked to think they had advanced beyond the
practice of deliberate physical cruelty, at least mong
themselves. This was certainly the climate among well-
meaning and well-intentioned Americans at the turn of this
century when, I suspect, the image of the Chinese tor-
turer-executioner made its most vivid impact on a wide
public. This occurred when broad currency was given to
pictures and accounts of acts comitted by Chinese against
foreigners and other Chinese during the Boxer uprising in
1900,. including most spectacularly the celebrated "tor-
ture of a thousand cuts." This was in part a journalistic
enterprise, but the same accounts moved even more directly
along the channels of the missionary network, since
missionaries had been among the victims of Boxer attacks.
Images of consummate and fearful evil were set down along-
side those of the "good' heathen, pictures of evil not
merely ungodly but inhuman. I have had some suggestion
from my interviews that these accounts left a lasting mark
on many American minds, impressions mitigated only over
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long periods of time under the influence of more benign
experience.*
For some Americans who in these decades made China
their second home, the streak of cruelty in Chinese life
could be absorbed for long per iods into an acceptance of
the fact that humanitarianism, as we understand it (i.e.,
Good Samaritanism), is largely absent from Chinese social
relations outside the boundaries of the family. The in-
difference--and to American eyes, callousness--of Chinese
to the fate of non-relatives in any kind of difficulty had
to be understood, and rationalized, as a social product
of the grim struggle for survival that chracterized Chinese
life as a whole. This rationalization could never quite
cover the more direct evidences of sadistic violence:
indisputable stories of torture have beeur the common fare
i I am indebted to one interviewee--a man who devoted his
whole career to China and rose to prominent place in his
field--for a specific reference to a long fictionalized
account of missionary travails at the1 hands of the Boxers
in China which appeared in the Youthts Copanion which he
had read in his boyhood. He remembered ni9therthe title
(which turned out to be "The Cross and the Dragon") nor the
date (which turned out to be 1911) but he did remember
vividly the sensations of terror it aroused. The impres-
sion was so sharp and so lasting that fifteen years later,
when he unexpectedly received word that he was to be sent
to China, the pictures based on this story rose to haunt
him in a veritable nightmare, and rose again clearly in the
course of our interview, thirty years after that. A typical
passage from the story: ... Eis captors proceeded to extract
information by means of such ingenious threats of torture
that Jack begged: 'Don't say anything more, Wang Chou!
You don't mean a word of it, but this talk of slicing him
to death by inches gives me the cold shivers.'"
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of all who have run afoul of power in China, whether under
the Communist regime or its Kuomintang predecessor. The
only new ingredient now would be the special forms of
mental torture which are the unique contribution of the
Communist totalitarians to the science of sadism. But
here, again, the facets shine only when the lights hit
them. In 1942 for most Americans the image of *Oriental'
cruelty had assumed an identity almost exclusively
Japanese. At that time the dominant Chinese figure in the
American mind was the heroic, long-suffering ally, while
the Japanese was the brutal soldier prodding dying
Americans on the march from Bataan. Thus that year in a
poll examining American notions of various national
characteristics, only 9% chose the adjective "cruel" to
describe the Chinese, compared to 52% "honest" and 48%
"brave,"* It seems fair to assume that had such a poll
been taken of an American sample at the height of the
Korean war, or at the time of the liberation of American
war prisoners after the Korean truce, these figures would
have been sharply different. The onset of Communist terror
and "persuasion" in China has undoubtedly revived in fall
measure the deeply latent images of cruelty associated
with the Chinese in many American minds, suggesting a
* Unless otherwise indicated, all polls cited in these notes,
when dated prior to 1946 are quoted from the Hadley Cantril
compilation, Public Opinion, 1985-1946, Princeton, 1951.
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power of evil that is not merely inhumane but bestial,
not human at all but subhuman.
Linked to this idea of the inhuman power of cruelty
in the Chinese is the idea of inhuman powers of endurance.
In its crudest form, this has cropped up among American
stereotypes in the shape of a notion that the Chinese are
somehow "nerveless," that they do not feel pain or suffer-
ing or stimulation in quite the same manner that Westerners
do. In Race Attitudes in Children, published in 1929,
Bruno Lasker reported one example of this from a contem-
porary detective story magazine:
a
In the case of/white man, such indulgence
might have caused sensational results. The
midget, though, was Chinese, uhich meant that
his nerves were not highly organized--that he
was virtually immune to stimulants. (p. 205)
Lasker also quoted from a popular camping manual for boys,
dated 1921, in which the author discusses nature's power
to adapt animal life to the environment, and after
speaking of "certain vertebrates, such as the mud tqrtle
and the hellbender," goes on:
And there is the Chinaman, uho being of a
breed that has been crowded and coerced for
thousands of years seems to have done away
with nerves. He will stand all day in one
place without seeming in the least distressed;
he thrives amidst the most unsanitary sur-
roundings; overcrowding and bad air are as
nothing to hin; he does not demand quiet when
he would sleep nor even when he is sick; he




This statement begins to illuminate a much wider
area for us: the cruelty from which these stereotypes
help us shrink is not the cruelty of the torture cham-
ber--which can never seem quite real--but the cruelty
of Chinese existence, the poverty and unremitting priva-
tion of so much of Chinese life, and the capacity of the
Chinese to adapt himself to incredibly adverse circum-
stance. This capacity is, indeed, a distinguishing mark
of many Chinese and has commanded the admiration of many
who have beheld it. To others, however, it has more
of ten seemed to be a capacity kin to that of the dumb
animal who knows no better, unrelated to the more com-
prehending and more comprehensible behavior of human
beings. Something like this was needed by some people
over the years to exorcise the reality of hardship in
China, to make it possible to attach small emotional
weight to images of widespread suffering, disaster, and
death. Only this made it possible over many decades for
American (and other Western) newspapers to report the
deaths of thousands and sometimes millions of people in
Chinese famines, floods, and droughts in obscure paragraphs
seldom exceeding a few lines in length. These brought
little reaction or attention: a few million Chinese more
or less could not seem materially important, or could
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not be allowed to seem so.*
This process took place at a distance. In decades
past China and all Asia might have been located on another
planet for all most Americans knew, and this distance in
itself played a role in the dehumanization of the Chinese
in many American minds. But this reporter watched it
take place as a live experience in the minds and behavior
of a considerable number of young Americans who were
abruptly transplanted as soldiers to the Asian scene
during the Second World War and met these faceless masses,
so to speak, face to face. The young American soldier
came upon a massed kind of pmoerty inconceivable to him,
he encountered brutality, indifference to the wounded.
Of this soldier I wrote:
It was too much for him to absorb, even
supposing he was willing to absorb it. His
initial reaction of shock, pity perhaps even
indignation, usually soon dissolved. He got
used to it, as you get used to the smell of a
stockyard. He had to live with it, adapt him--
self to it. Hefound it increasingly difficult
to look upon these Asiatics as men and women.
Only some subhuman species could live as they
did, submit as they did. You could not apply
* A similar point is suggested by the joke, familiar in
the '80s, in which a Chinese receives successive battle
reports: 5,000 Japanese killed, 20,000 Chinese killed;
10,000 Japanese killed, 100,000 Chinese killed and so
on through mounting figures in the same proporions. The
Chinese smiles gleefully at each new tiding. Asked to
explain his joy, he replies: "Fine! Pretty soon no more
Japanese."
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normal standards to your thinking about them.
Pity usually gave way to indifference, im-
patience; contempt, even hatred. (No Peace
For Asia, New York: Macmillan, 1947, p. 
Two illustrative anecdotes from the same source: On
the scene of a small action in which Chinese soldiers
had kept on advancing in the face of Japanese fire
that was killing them in masses, the remark was made to
a watching American off icer that this kind of courage
deserved better leadership. "Courage?" he snorted in
angry disgust. "All right, courage. But do you say a
mule has courage because he keeps on going until he
drops?" Another snatch of talk about anaction in which
the Chinese soldiers died in droves, and as almost always,
uselsely:
One American was describing with some passion
the course of operations across the river.
'They threw away three thousand men , he said,
'three thousand menu' One of the olhers looked
at him contemptuously. 'So what,' he said,
'since when are you bleeding for three thousand
slopeys? T don't bleed about it, do they?'"
(Ibid., pp. -81.)
One clue to this, I believe, is the fact that Western
man--and especially American man--is haunted by the largely
unheeded injunction that he be his brother's keeper.
Confronted with the scope and depth of human hardship
of others about which he could or would do nothing, the
only tolerable way out of the dilemma was to deny or at
least to diminish the human quality of the suffering in
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view: to make the victim something less than his brother.
This could be done either by distinguishing no individual
victim at all in the great faceless mass, or trans-
muting him into a different kind of being with a different
set of nerves, or no nerves at all, a person, in fact who
can "starve to death with supreme complacency," a person
who places so much lower a value on his life than we do
that we cannot--or dare not--equate his life with one of
our own. In short, to make him subhuman.
-32-
V- The Superior People
As souls to be saved or as wards or as subinmans, the Chinese
have appeared in many American minds in images that have reinforced
in different ways the American's sense of superiority, But this
pattern co-exists with another, often in these same minds, which
acknowledges and admires a whole series of superior aspects in
Chinese culture and qualities in what In conceived to be the Chinese
character itself.
This sense of a superiority of the Chinese tends to be associated,
for the most part, with China's ancient greatness and its surviving
legacies. We have already mentioned tha fact that almost every AmericL
school child at some time or another acquires some impression of Uhina's
age, of its superior wisdom and arts in a time long prior to the rise
of Western civilization as we know it* Because in many visible forms,
at least, this "old" China persisted so nearly into modern times and
because in any case the Chinese people are the products of such an
impressively long history, the feeling of respectful admiration is
often aroused and persists without any clear placement in time, This
China, it any rate, is the setting occupied by such figures as the
venerable sage, the wise and patient philosopher, the scholar-
official, the hardy peasant, the respected father, the faithful son,
the dedicated widow, the gifted poet, the teller of tales, the sensitis
artist, the skilful artisan, and maar others*
.me,,'
Of these figures perhaps the most pervasive is the sage, Here
we find the whole cluster of knowledge, notions, and asRociations which
has made the very name of Gonfacius a popular symbol of wisdom. At a
broad, popular level this may consist only of the bare knowledge that
a sage named Caufucius lived a long time ago and represents not only
wisdom but pie 'y and common sense0 In some cases, this may be no
more than a rdflection, in people of a certain age, of the impact of
Earl Derr Bigger's character, the detective Charlie .han, who in
magazine, film, radio, and comic strips, seen and heard ty millions
in the 1930s, always punctuated his sleuthing triumphs with some
64&ristic bit beginning "Confucius say--o" Bat we also encounter
this awareness at quite another level, where serious scholarship or
serious reading, or an interest in philosophy or religion, has led to
more substantial contact with the literature of (hinese thoughto
There is a considerable shelf of books written by Americans on this
subject and a fairly steady reprinting of various excerpts and semi-
popular interpretations of the works of Chin*se philosophers I find
that almost regardloss of the extent of actual knowledge the words
1a.ratin 1a . orderly. serene.ohisi1aed are among those
most often evoked in this connection. These all sungest values, both
of intellect and of personality, with obvious attractiveness for a
great many Americans. Indeed, for Aerican scholars, teachers, and
intellectual$ espeoialls there is a certain warming of the cockles
associated with the top ranking given to their similarx in the formal
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code of the old Chinese society, This is an ordering of prestige
which often contrasts rather sharply with that of our own society and
I suspect it to be at least one source of the generalized attitude of
admiration for the Cihinese that I find among Americans of this type.
In the classrooms of our country - perhaps even in high school but
certainly in college - some of this has rubbed off on a great many
Americans indeed*
Here too we find other fragments of awareness of features of
Chinese and character which frequently arouse respect or admiration
or aesthetic pleasure* Whether by comparison or by contrast, many of
these represent values highly regarded by many Americans, eg. family
responsibility, respect for the aged, filial piety, admiration for
learning, and a talent for exquisite art and wdrkmanship, Along with
these will also frequently go a set of more stereotyped characteristics
widely attributed to the Chinese character as sucho honesty, industry,
- thrift, frugality, serenity** The notion that the Chinese possess
these things in superior measure is widespread and deeply imbedded.
It comes in part from images evoked in the classroom, or from reading
books like the "Dream of the Red Chamber," the works of Lin Yu-fang
in the years of his American vogue, or, even more popularly, the novels
* --- These attributed characteristics, in both their positive and
negative forms will be examined in a later section of this paper
on "The Ghinese In the U0 So "
or
of Pearl Suck, and perhaps most of all from the early reading of
Chinese folk tales in the many anthologies and story books widely
read by American children even nowo These have been recalled, almost
always with a noticeable glow of pleasure, by a remarkable number of
those interviewed so far in this study.
It comes, too, from examples of Uhinese art and craftsmanship
which have, of course, a long history of impact on the senses of
both &iropeans and Americans: the vogue for naiserius thich
developed in iurope two centuries ago persists in various forms down
to our own day. The characteristic lines of Chinese architecture
bring instant recognition in almost any person who has ever held a
geography book or a story book in his hand. Western musemus and
private collections are crowded with Chinese jades and carvings and
porcelains, with paintings, scrolls, rich silks and tapestries. Indeed,
even though the art of glazing has been firmly naturalised in several
Auropean countries, the associations of fragile beauty with fine ghmng
occasionally add another tragment to this highly idealised view of
Uhinese culture and its products. The use of Chinese styles and motifs
in interior decoration, quite conmon in our own day, still is not
always the happiest kind of aesthetic borrowinga bet it clearly
satisfies many people, giving them a sense of the unique, the exotic,
the beautiful, in ways that clearly contribute imoh to this positive
and admiring view of things Chinesea
These are, so far, bits and pieces of appreciations, notions, and
behavior quite common among Americans who have never been to China or
even dreamed of doing there., But broadened and deepened to take in
all the multiplying and raaifying experiences of the ewhl number of
Americans who have gone there, who have lived there for years or
decades, and who have made China their careers, this is the stuff of
which sinophiles are madeo Not only from among missionaries, but from
among those who went to Uhina during the last half-century to study or
teach or write, to serve as diplomats or in other government pests, or
even to do business, there emerged a distinctive group marked by a
deeply sentimental attachment to their Chinese environment. This would
sometimes be precious, even ridiculous, taking on some of the more
transparent attributes of expatriation, Sometimes it might reflect the
extraordinary psychological and physical comfort of the foreigner's
life in China in the more placid interludes of these yearse the defer-
ence received, the apartness and uniquaness achieved, the high indi-
vidUal visibility of the foreigner in the swarming sea of Chinese
faces, the satisfying ease and inexpensiveness of space and sbrvice.
In this setting not a few Americans lapsed rather easily into patterns
typical of many colonial Europeans, But for many others in China, it
could also be the respect commanded by the great past, the impressiveness
of the literature, the history, the art, or the visible relics and
legacies of it all - the temples, the walls, the countrysides crusted
with the many layers of the millenia, It could often be, too, a
response to the living landscape, the cheerful clatter of everyday
existence even amid hardship, the beauty beyond the squalor in the
scene, in the life, in the people themselves. St could be a sen*e of
the need to expiate guilt for wrongs done, for privations caused or
imposedo It could be the friendships and the loyalties and the con-
tinuous discovery of the new and the arresting in a culture so old and
a setting so different and, in so many ways, admirable, These indi-
viduals are relatively few in zumber0  But they are the authors of
many books, the writers of mach correspondence., They are now in exile
from their second home and many are ocoupring chairs and posts in
universities, in publishing, in museums, business, and government,
They are the source of one of the deeper currents of special feeling
about China, in and of themselves and, more widely, among the many to
whom they manage to communicate the quality of their particular
emotions on the subject.
The notion of the superiority of Chinese civilisation - sometimes
identified with the distant past but often attributed in some measure t
the present - is widely hold. This seems to be true whether the contA
has been direct and deeply personal or vagrant and vicarious, the
result of conscious study or only a snatch of feeling or idea associated
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with something beyonj immediate recall, this has shown up quite
clearly in almost all the interviews conducted so far in the course of
my present inquiry: of those with some personal experience in China
all tut a few display some facet of this highly positive emotional bias
and a majority of those without any such experienos show some indication
of having been touched somewhere, sometime, by a similar or related
feeling. Again, I suspect this to be almost unique among the patterns
of American relationships with other peoples and cultures, There is some
comparison to be made between this and the special attachment of some
Americans to the life and culture of England. More nearly comparable,
perhaps, might be the special place occupied in some American minds
by the culture, people, history, art, and life of France,*
"--As in the case of France, the matter of food is mixed up
somewhere in this picture. Chinese food has won a special place, even
in this land of many cuisines0 I do not know that any enterprising
researcher has looked into the matter, but it is hard not to suspect that
the vast- .umbers of Americans who leave Chinese restauraats every day
with a great sense of wellbeing do develop some feeling of admiration
for the originators of such delectables, especially if this Is the only
or principal contact they have all their lives long with anything Chines.,
this invites some speculation about the possiblities of the encounter in
some American minds between the stereotyped figure of the chronically-
starved Chinese and the heaped rich dishes of the typical Chinese dinner
This may occur rarely among eaters at Chinese restaurants in this country,
But it is worth mentioning that for Americane who have eaten in restaurants
in China, it was a repeated and quite literal experience s the poor would
often be clustered there, seeking scraps at the back doors. Americans
sensitised to such contrasts - and few vere not- would on h occasions
eat not only good food but, in an eloquent Chinese phrase,itterness too004
I- The WarriorF
American images of the Chinese as warriors have passed through a
remarkable series of transformations within a relatively brief span Of
historic time. 'Drawing more or less erratically from both fact and
fancy, this set of images describes a wide circle around which we can
discern at least the following
* O. the iMongol hordes In the time of Genghiz Khan (fearful)
-G. the low-status warrior in ancient Chinese society (odd)
-0= the opera bouffe warrior of the warlord period, 1912-37 (comic)
0- the heroic fighter resisting Japanese invasion, 193741 (admirable)
-0- the incompetent, graft-ridden, useless ally in the
war against Japan. 1941-45 (aggravating)
-0- the competent, fanatic, well-trained hordes in the
time of Mao Tse-tung, current (fearful and dangerous) 0
Uf course, the Mongol hordes of the 13th century were not Chinese,
but are generally lumped with the Chinese in a generalized image of
Asiatic barbarism, this image, as I have already suggested, is the
clear ancestor of many of the notions attached in modern times to the
idea of the "Yellow peril," awakened by the events of the Boxer
Rebellion in 1900, the non-military but still related idea of the
"swarms" of immigrating Chinese overwhelming the white populat ion of,
say, California, the sense that runs throug much politiwal writirg
about China in the past 50 years that it was a sleeping giant (or, more
0typically cartoon style, a sleeping dragon) which, once awakened would
breathe fire again across the world, This fear-inspiring image lay
dormant through much of this time but it could be and has been inter-
mittently revived by recurring eventse One example of this was the
lurid prophecy written by the sensationalist Floyd Gibbous in 1929
under the title "The Red hapoleon " Gibbons depicted the rise of a
new Genghiz Khan, rising in Asiatic Russia, who would, under the red
banner, come close to destroying the world in a war scheduled to take
place between 1933 and 1938. This story appeared serially in the Mearst
press, the ancestral American home of the Yellow Peril. It was splashed
with illustrations which evoked the full nightmare quality of new Mongol
hordes over-running the peaceful order of Western civilization, The
same Heart press within a few years wax dealing admiringly with the rise
of the forces which did., in fact, lead to a new barbarian descent on
Murope in 1939, not but of Asia but out of one of the cradles of our
own civilization, This brief resurgence of the Hun overlay only for
a time, however, the more fearful images and expectations out of Asia
which have never' been quite extinguished and which have now been revived
in much fuller and more substantial form since the Comunwist conquest
of China in 1949,
The cycle has carried us from fearful hordes to fearful hordes
in seven centuries, but in between we have experienced a series of
quite contrasting images of the Chinese as warrior. One of these is
connected with the moderately well-known fact that in ancient Chinese
society the warrior occupied the bottom rung of the social scale, He
was no pariah - Chinese history is full of its warrior-heroes - but in
a formal sense he was assigned a low rating of social prestigs. This
was an odd sort of fact, capable of apealing to the impulse toward
pacifism in the Christian tradition or even an idealized sweet reason-
ableness a it contributed in some measure to the image of wise serenity
associated with ancient Chinese culture,
There is a related image, associated with much more modern times,
which was, by contrast, definitely comic in its impact,, This wee the
image of the opera bouffe soldier of the warlord era of recent Uhinese,
history, the decades roughly between 1912 and 1937 This was the image
of the Chinese soldier carrying an umbrella and a seldom-used gun, of
battles fought rather across cups of tea than contested terrain, of
victory-through-bribery or victory-through-comoromise rather than by
actual force of arms0  The impression left by much of the voluminous
literature written by Americans in this period was one of recurring
civil wars which managed to disrupt the life of the country but which
were fought on the whole more with "silver bullets" than with lead,
i.* , the Judicious purchase of breason in the camp of the foe. There
was some measure of truth in this picture, although large numbers
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of impressed soldiers ad even larger numbers of inrcent bystanders
in the countryside were killed just as dead in Chinese civil wars as
people are in Western wars, These deatho among the faceless millions
se.ldom registered.
The image of the opera bouffe warrior and his warlord master
began to give way somewhat during the great revolutionary upheavals that
occurred in China in the 1920s but it persisted well into the period of
the Japanes invasion of China, which began in Manchuria in 1931o This
invasion marks a great watershed in the course of American relation-
ships with Asian affairs. In the beginning, of course, it stirred only
a few Americans in a few high places to a new sense of the growing
Japanese threat to the United States, At the outset it made relatively
little impact on the miade of American% generally, and this is one
reason why Henry LO Stimon's attempt to take a "strong' line at the
time failed, This, it seems fair to say, was due at least in part to
the fact that the Japanese marched rather than fougit their way to their
large conquests of this period.-. The official Uhinese policy then, and
for six years afterward, was anon-resistancea signalized by the ig-
nominious retreat from Manchuria of the "Ywg Marshal" O.%ang Hush-liang-s
much-touted armies, and the repeated surrenders, concessions, and
compromises by the Nationalists at banking under Chiang Kait-shek oopled
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to the rigorous repression of those who did want to resist the Japanese
encroachments.
The two examples of such resistance which might just possibly be
remembered by some Americans - the running fight by the Manchurian
general Va Chan-shan as he retreated northward toward Siberia late in
1931 and the more spectacular 34-day resistance of the 19th Route Army
in Shanghai in January - February, 1932 - both occurred in defiance of
the official leadership, a fact little appreciated outside of China at
the time, Both episodes did, however, through -being widely reported -
especially the battle at 3hanghai which took place before the eyes of
an astounded foreign community and a large body of hastily-assembled
foreign correspondents - begin the process of effacing the image of the
opera bouffe Uhinese soldier from the American mind, It began to be
replaced with the picture of hardy soldiers capable of great military
feats when decently-led and motivated.
This change did not become generally effective until 1937 when the
Japanese began their full-scale invasion of China Proper itself, when
uhiang Kai-shek finally took the path of resistance, and when, in
December of that year the Japanese entry into the city of Nanking was
accompanied by rapine and mass slaughter. This last was a particularly
well-reported event. It aroused indignation, horror, and to some extent,
fear, in large sections of the American public. Chiang Kai-shek s
military showing in this initial period of resistance was not spectacular.
All the disabling factors which were to emerge to bedevil American
military men a few years later were decisive in large measure in re-
ucing Chinese military effectiveness against the Japanese* But there
was ample opportunity for the Chinese soldier to show the world his
hitherto unsuspected worth. Mostly in desperate rear guard actions or
isolated battles, Uhinese units fought hard and helped make many a
Chinese defeat look like a moral victory, especially in view of the
immense disparity in armaments and war supplies between the contending
forces. A new Uhinese military figure entered the b of the
American imagination: the heroic defender facing the well-mounted
Japanese invader almost barehanded and doggedly giving up ground only
when it had been rendered useless to the invader: It is not now commonly
remembered that the nhrase scorhed eardh entered our langage from
the Uhinese at this time,* This impression derived in large measure
from the truly remarkable spectacle of long lines of Chinese burden-
bearers carrying whole factories in bits and pieces inland from the
coast. This was recorded in newsreels and photos which made a tremendous
impact at the time and which have been spontaneously recalled by not
a few of the respondents in the present Inquiry. There was, in
short, enough striking reality in these events to provide the basis
*--- The Chinese phrase was ban kU, literally. burned earth. Another
Uhinese phrase acquired general currency at this same periods yL kg
ghtnA hEA.E nhih chien, trade space for time
for the much more imaginative mythology about the defenders of China
which became common cuurency among millions of Americans between 1937
and 1941, especially as it was personalized in the figures of Chiang
Kai-shek and his wife, Mai-ling Soong,
Strong sympathy for China in the war with Japan developed among
h1ericans after 1937, It was partly rooted in half-facts and half-myths,
and partly in a slowly - awakening self-interest, This sympathy seemed
to b% to a considerable extent, a spontaneous reaction to events widely
and graphically reported in the American press. It was also fanned by
ardent and energetic propaganda efforts by individual missionaries
and some mitsionary groups, and by other pressure groups which took
their cue from what wb might call the Stimson outlook of that period,
ioe., the growing sense that Japan was becoming a dangerous foe, that
not only the welfare of the underdog China was involved, but the safety
and security and power of the United States itself, This conviction
took root and steadily grew, as the opinion poll data to be summarised
elsewhere in this study will show. The sense of the need to do some-
thing to help China rose in direct proportion to the growth of the
awareness that Japan's course was a threat to the United States0 In
the beginning there was not enough popular feeling, as the polls indi-
cated, to stimulate any boycott of Japanese products by ordinary American
consumers and certainly not enough to impede the conduct of profitable
business between this country and Japo.n in scrap metal, oil, cotton,
and other vital materialso While this was going on, the ChineSe -
feeling strongly ]Meta.ed, incidentally, by the United States - got
most of their outside help from 4ussia, Germany, and Czechoslovakia.
By 1940, however, American sentiment had established ±tself to the
point where official ban3 were placed on this trade, and by the end of
1941, as the polls quite clearly showed, a majority of Americans had
become ready to go to war with Japan, if necessary, to check its on-
ward march. Pearl Harbor opened a new series of events and experiences
in the course of which our image of the Uhinese as warrior shifted
again to new ground.
The experience of mericans in relation to Uhina during and after
the Second dorld War is, of course, a large and largely controversial
subject. This experience culminated in the Communist conquest of hina
and was followed by the "great debate" over Luhina policy in all the
country's forums, big and small, These events brought Uhina to the
front and center of the American political scene, where it has remained
and will remain for the indefinitely long future.. One primary object
of our present inquiry is to glimpse, if we can, the reshaping of old
and the rise of new images about China in American thinking as a reudt
of this experience, This will involve some detailed examination under
at least two main headingst (1) the impact of their China experience
an Americans who were actually in Ghina during some part of this time
and (2) the impact of these events on the American public and0 most
partiilarly, on the individuals who are the wibjects of this investi-
gationo Since, as a participant observer, I have already written some
of my impressions of the first of these items (* In lo Pewa for AsA. Chap.l.)
and since discussion of the second might much better await the completion
of my present interviewing schedule, this larger subject will not
figure directly in the present draft of background notes.,
Uoncerning our images of the Chinese as warriors, however, some
observations can pertinently be added here. During the Japaneso war,
American military men worked with the Chinese armies from the top
staff down to the battalion level, Is staff planning, in training pro-
grams, and in actual combat operations, The result, in general, was
frustration. The effort suffered in part from limitations imposed by
the wartime strategy which made China a low-priority theater8 But
far more saliently, these Americans came up against circumstances for
which they had hardly been prepared by the propaganda of the mheroic"
period in hina before Pearl Harbor. These included the stricken
weakness of the Chinese nation, Its sise and backwardness, prevalent
corruption and ineptitude in high places, and absence of effective
leadership capable of arousing and maintaining popular support and
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because of all these things - an incapacity to marshal and use an
effective military force. The result, in the end, was an abandonment
of all military plans that called for any major effort on mainland
Uhina.
Reactions of the individual Americans Involved in this enterprise,
of course, varied very widely. It seems fair to say, however, that a
predominant impression with which they left China was one of "a hopeless
mess" For some, it was the Chinese leadership that was most spectamularly
hopeless. A sma2ller mnmber developed some respect for the ordinary
Oninese soldier but in large part he, too, was seen as the hopeless -
and helpless - victim of cirumstanceso It was quite common to hear
among American military men in China the remark that " a few American
divisions" in Uhina could accomplish more than the whole Chinese army
of several million men. This armw was seen as an amorpheus, buttery
mass incapable of functioning effectively incapable of learning
adequately from its American instructors, too backward and lawking in
essential education to make good use of modern techniques and weapons cf
warfare.
How much of this seeped eventually to a wider Aerican publio
would be difficult to say. The mrtim *China problem" blew up in
November, 1944, with the recall of General Joseph Stilwell from the
China commando This was followed by a aash of "revelations" inA
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responsible American newspapers and magazines about Chinese corruption
and nefficiency. This related to much more than Chiise llitary
capacity aloneo It brought into question the ability of the Chinese
regime to survive. It was this sense of the danger of total collapse
that led the United States Government, between 1946 and 1948, into the
vain attempt to find a formula for saving the Chinese Nationalists frma
total collapse through some kind of coalition arrangement that would
avert or postpone the Conmmunist power drive& When this failed, the
Nationalists simply crumbled before the advancing Commwnistso If
none of the preceding events had done so. the evift Coimmist victories
in 1949 certainly gave a fairly wide American public a picture of a
Chinese leadership no longer heroic but broken and rendered impotent
largely by its own internal weakness. These are the matters which
became the subject of the "great debate" in the United States which
reached its height in 1950-51. This debate was made to center on
two main allegations8 that the United States could have done more to
support the Nationalists and thereby kept us from "losing Ohina
and that its failure to do so was the result not merely of incompetence
but of treason on high places in Washington. Lter on in our present
inquiry, we will have occasion to review the impact and resional effect
of this controversy, at least as it shows up in its effect on the
individuals interriewed. But what we. do wish to note here is the
remarkable transformation that has taken place amid these events in
American images of the Uhinese as warriors*
Phinese soldiery, a pulpy and ineffectual MM under the Mationalist
banner, becamq under the Commniste powerful and threatening hare*&,
the Chinese Uomumist army had previously impressed American military
observers with its superiority over the Nationalists but there was
relatively little preparation for the fanatically effective power which
was uncovered in Korea when a Chinese army crossed the Yalu at the end
of 1950 and all but engulfed the opposing American force. In the
picture of a Chinese force described.at the time as totalling about
a million men driving down upon an American and allied force perhaps
a fifth as large, all the imagery deriving from the Songol hordes
concept was sharply and frighteningly revivedo Mach was made of the
sheer business of numbers. Bat there was more to it than thise the
Chinese attackers used artillery and their other weapons in a manner
that Americans who had tried to teach these arts in China only a few
years earlier would have regarded as impossiblec. The irony was even
more complete, because no small part of the Chinese force that entered
Korea consisted precisely of soldiers who had been at least partially-
trained 1W Americans during the var against Japan and the arms they




The new image of the 'hinese as warriors s -s actiAly dominated
by much more than the concept of fanatically murderous masses, These
are Mongol hordes with big guns and jet aircraft and men who apparently
know how to use our own weapons against us, We have, thus, undergone
a transformation in our image not only of the Chinese as warrior, but
of the Chinese as military technician. Both in relation to Xorea and
Indochina, the training of Rorean and Indochinese Commnists ]a 1Ah
Chinese in the technical crafts of war has been cited again and again
in official statements and in the public prints as a matter of dangerota
concern0  This has been paralleled, in these few short years, by
acceptance of the picture of the Chinese as technical mentors in the
crafts of peace as wells Uhinese railroad and communications and in-
dustrial assistance i annourleed as beixig provided to Coimmunist allies
both in Korea and Indochina, And all this from a country which less
than a decade ago was viewed both by American speicalists and by a
wider public as almost hopelessley backward and incapable of marshalling
a military power dangerous to anybody but itself0 Today China is
ranked as a miljdia r nowz in 4nsrican strategic calculations far
above most of the countries of Western Nurope. We see the Chinese as
military foes second in weight and msnaoe only to the Russians themselves.,
S would seem rather imrortant to ponder the meaning of this staggering
transposition of images or of facts in this brief period of time
